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THE PAN-AMERICAN POLICY OF 
JEFFERSON AND WILKINSON 



BY 



ISAAC JOSUN COX 













Reprinted from the Mississim 
Valley Histoeical Revie%\ 
Vol. T, Spptember, 1914 




6v Transfer 

i318 



^ 1/ X^l^^ >-'«-'\^l 




THE PAN=AMERICAN POLICY OF JEFFERSON AND 

WILKINSON 



THE PAN-AMERICAN POLICY OP JEFFERSON AND 

WILKINSON 

The desire of President Jefferson to gain the Floridas pro- 
foundly influenced his whole attitude towards Napoleon Bona- 
parte. Early in 1808 this led the emperor to hint that ^^dth 
proper subserviency in regard to past commercial exactions and 
a future alliance against England the American executive might 
obtain his long-cherished desire. Armstrong, our minister to 
France, did not fancy the purpose that seemed to animate the 
French emperor nor the language in which he expressed it, and 
advised his government to declare war against either France or 
England, but in either case to seize the Floridas at once. Jeffer- 
son and Madison did indeed publish Napoleon's imperious de- 
mand; but at the same time they assumed a mild tone in their in- 
structions to Armstrong that little comported with vigorous 
action. They likewise instructed him to assure the imperious 
autocrat that they "had chosen as the basis for their policy a 
fair and sincere neutrality among the contending Powers," and 
were unwdlling to abandon it "for the purpose of obtaining a 
separate and particular object, however interesting to them." 
Yet they might be led by British hostility to preoccupy this 
territory, and in that case would be pleased to know that "the 
measure [had] received His Majesty's approbation.'" 

Napoleon made his proposal just as he was about to overthrow 
the Bourbon power in Spain, for the evident purpose of per- 
suading the United States to countenance his later plans in re- 
gard to Spanish-America; but his threat and its accompanying 
bribe proved equally ineffectual. As Madison wrote Armstrong, 
Great Britain had views upon Spanish-America as well as Na- 
poleon, and was equally interested in the neutrality of the Unit- 
ed States. The latter nation could easily stir up a revolution 
in Spanish-America, but would not do so if well treated by 
both belligerents. Upon being informed of this assumption of 

1 Henry Adams, History of the United States (New York, 1889-1891), 4:293, 306. 



Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 213 

neutrality the emperor unblusliingly denied the bribe that his 
ruthless despoiling of Spain had seemed to make possible. - 

The famous "Dos de Maio" in Madrid presented to Jefferson 
another opportunity to realize his wish. That memorable up- 
rising of the Spanish people against their oppressors did not, it 
is true, greatly arouse Jefferson's sympathy. His "pursuit of 
Florida," to quote Henry Adams, had enmeshed him too com- 
pletely for that. Rather, while Bonaparte was occupied with 
Spain, he anticipated that England would make up with the 
United States. Then without committing himself to either of 
the principal contestants he expected to seize West Florida as 
far as the Perdido as a rightful possession and "the residue of 
the Floridas" as a reprisal for the spoliations that for years he 
had vainly urged France and Spain to acknowledge. Thus his 
policy was an exceedingly selfish one. In carrying it out he pro- 
posed to gather his new recruits and armed vessels at points 
where they would be ready to act, the moment Congress au- 
thorized the blow. He thought he already had a sufficient force 
near Baton Rouge to attend to that post and he must now pre- 
pare for the seizure of Mobile, Pensacola, and St. Augustine. The 
embargo afforded the necessary pretext for massing troops on 
the St. Mary's and the Tombigbee.^ 

Early in September Gallatin warned him from New York that, 
despite the tone of the Washington papers, there was a general 
feeling in favor of the Spanish patriots.* Yet the president did 
not abandon his quest for the Floridas, but affected to be puz- 
zled by Armstrong's earlier advice to seize them at once. The 
tidings of the victories over the French at Bailen and Vimeiro 
rendered Napoleon less fomiidable but increased the possibility 
that England might become the protector of the threatened 
Spanish colonies. It was with this in mind that the president 
recorded the determination of the cabinet after its meeting of 
October 22: "Unanimously agreed in the sentiments which 
should be unauthoritatively expressed by our agents to influen- 
tial persons in Cuba and Mexico, to-wit: 'If you remain under 
the dominion of the kingdom and family of Spain, we are con- 

2 Adams, History of the United States, 4:311. 

3 Thomas Jefiferson, Writings (Ford ed. — New York, 1892-1899), 9:203. 
* Jefferson Papers, ser. 3, vol. 7:71. 



214 /. J. Cox M- V. H. R. 

tented; but we should be extremely unwilling to see you pass 
under the dominion or ascendency of France or England. In 
the latter case, should you choose to declare independence, we 
cannot now commit ourselves by saying we would make common 
cause with you, but must reserve ourselves to act according to 
the then existing cii'cumstances ; but in our proceedings we shall 
be influenced by friendship to you, by a iirm feeling that our 
interests are intimately connected, and by the strongest repug- 
nance to see you under subordination to either France or Eng- 
land either politically or commercially.' " ^ 

It was in keeping with this decision that the president, a week 
later, answered a communication of William C. C. Claiborne, who 
as governor of Oi-leans Territory was in a favorable position 
to know the sentiments of neighboring Spanish officials. Clai- • 
borne had sent him a Spanish paper that savagely attacked the 
American policy. In part the president replied: "The truth 
is that the patriots of Spain have no warmer friends than the 
Administration of the United States, but it is our duty to say 
nothing for or against either [faction]." After expressing the 
opinion of the cabinet in regard to Cuba and Mexico, he added : 
"We consider their interests and ours as the same, and that the 
object of both must be to exclude all European influence fi"om 
this hemisphere. ' ' The governor was instructed to express this 
sentiment to any proper characters from either province and 
particularly to inform them that the American authorities had 
"nothing more at heart than their friendship." " 

Despite the protest one feels that the Floridas still played 
an important part in Jefferson's professed friendship for Spain 
or her colonies. The eontemporaiy Spanish officials on the 
imperiled frontier continued to think so and there was much 
in Jefferson's subsequent utterances and deeds to justify them. 
In none does this appear so clearly as in his selection of the 
envoy to convey his new message of friendliness. His choice 
fell on General James Wilkinson, a former discretlited Spanish 
pensioner. In this task Wilkinson, the agent, was as thoroughly 
influenced by personal motives as was Jefferson by the prospect 
of immediate national gain. 

5 Adams, History of the United States, -1:340. 

•iThomas Jefferson, Writings (Memorial ed. — Washington, 19031004), 12:186. 



Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 215 

AVilkinson's first reference to this propaganda occurs in his 
letter of March 12, 1807, although in this he mentioned Jeffer- 
son's earher desire to occupy Cuba. In his view the United 
States and Great Britain should combine to preserve the western 
world from Napoleon and his unwiUing ally, the king of Spain. 
With the aid of the British fleet they could preserve their own 
territory, occupy Cuba, reduce the Floridas, and give independ- 
ence to Mexico.^ He evidently made this suggestion to conceal 
from his superior the true character of Walter Burling 's mission 
to Mexico City and to induce the president to pay for it. Later 
in the same month he suggested that an alliance composed of 
the independent states of Mexico, Peru, and Cuba might, with 
the aid of the United States, bid defiance to the Old World. 

It is possible to infer that Wilkinson's references to an Amer- 
ican alliance were inspired by a desire to neutralize in the mind 
of the executive the storm of protest that his arbitrary career 
in New Orleans had aroused. If so, it proved largely ineffective. 
A like result followed his proposal for common action with Great 
Britain. The Chesapeake affair destroyed such a possibility. 
For a time it was doubtful if his vulnerable reputation could 
withstand the public execration aroused by the Burr trial, the 
congressional attacks urged on by John Randolph, and the in- 
vestigation by a military court of inquiry. But in betraying 
Burr he had gained the support, if not the confidence of Jeffer- 
son, while his Spanish intermediaiy. Governor Vizente Folch of 
West Florida, almost perjiired himself in his behalf.' Thus he 
prospered far beyond Ms deserts, and resplendent in a coat of 
official whitewash, next appeared before his former Spanish 
pajTuasters, as the harbinger of a new day of freedom. 

It is difficult to determine why Jefferson selected Wilkinson 
for this role. The general's own advocacy may have influenced 
him, but it is more likely that he also hoped to make the other 
break with his former Spanish accomplices. Very likely he 
doubted if Wilkinson had disproved the charges of corrupt deal- 
ings with the Spaniards. But the narrow escape from convic- 

7 Wilkinson to Jefferson, Mareh 12, 1807. Papers Eelative to Burr's Conspiracy, 
manuscript in bureau of rolls and library, department of state. 

<* Report of the Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Condxict of General 
Wilkinson, February 36, 1811 (Washington, 1811), 42-50. Ezekiel Bacon was chair- 
man of the committee. 



216 1. J. Cox Ji- V. H. R. 

tion must have aroused feelings of repentance in his subordi- 
nate. By sending him on a mission that would be distasteful to 
his former bribers, the president might eifectually remove him 
from further temptation of this sort. At the same time Wilkin- 
son could serve as well as another to warn the Spanish colonial 
oflBcials not to cultivate close commercial or political relations 
with Great Britain, and to proffer the friendly aid of the United 
States. 

About a year after he had proposed that Great Britain and 
the United States should unite in favor of a New World policy, 
Wilkinson warned Jose Vidal, the Spanish vice consul at New 
Orleans, against the machinations of the former power. He an- 
nounced the accession of Ferdinand VII to the throne of Spain 
and the presence of a French agent on the Mexican border. He 
then informed the other that the British officials were also plan- 
ning a series of intrigues in the Spanish colonies, and desired 
the United States to make common cause with them. Should 
the latter refuse to cooperate they would carry on their propa- 
ganda alone, and would probably include in it an attack on the 
Floridas and even New Orleans." This possibility, together with 
the rumor that Burr was re^^^^ng his project, was sufficient to 
justify Wilkinson's warning. One suspects, however, that he 
may have designed it to assist the application that he had just 
made to Folch for an exculpatory letter to be used before the 
court of inquiry. 

After this tribunal rendered its favorable but undeserved 
verdict, Wilkinson largely ceased to play the part of suppliant 
with his Spanish correspondents. In his letter to Governor 
Folch, August 25, 3808, he wrote that Spain was bound to fall 
under the control of Bonaparte. The Spanish colonies might 
then declare their independence under a new dj'nasty, with a new 
order of nobility in which Folch ought to have an important 
station. If talent for intrigue was a requirement, Folch certain- 
ly could meet it. The new nation would then have to decide 
whether to seek European or American alliance. At any rate, 
as he urged three weeks later, the Spanish colonies must defend 

9 Inclosure in letter of Vidal to Iturrigaray, Ai>iil 7, 1808. Marina, 1809 a 1814, 
Archive General y Publico de la Nacion, Mexico. H. E. Bolton. Guide to Materials for 
Ihe History of the United States in the Principal Archives of Mexico (Washington, 
1913), 183. 



Vol. T, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 217 

themselves. The British could never prevent Spain from suc- 
cumbing to Bonaparte, although they were extending their influ- 
ence throughout her colonies wherever possible, and planning to 
control the whole of them. For the present Napoleon was paying 
no attention to this phase of the contest, but in the course of 
two years he would force England to make peace, ceding Span- 
ish-America to him. When this region inevitably yielded itself, 
the conqueror would vigorously proscribe his enemies. So Wil- 
kinson advised Folch to delay assuming sides. "In the mean- 
time, ' ' he added, ' ' save your province from any European power 
and let Someruelos take care of Cuba, which may slip into the 
hands of a false friend." To relieve his suggestion of selfish- 
ness he added: "My country must undoubtedly sympathize 
with Spanish-America and if called on will help her. ' ' '" 

In this warning about West Florida and Cuba Wilkinson had 
Jefferson's policy in mind. To his patron he now wrote in re- 
gard to the other project, expressing the "liveliest hopes" in 
the speedy emancipation of Mexico and South America. Possibly 
liis hopes were lively because of his expressed desire to partici- 
pate in this "glorious achievement."" He emphasized the de- 
sirability and necessity of an "excision of our transatlantic con- 
nections" by which "we should escape the allurements of inor- 
dinate wealth and the poisons of luxurious indulgence," and 
asserted: "Our acquaintance with the European World would 
gradually subside, fleets and Armies would insensibly become 
useless to a People of self government; and a persevering re- 
spect for ancient habits, and a fine adherence to principle, would 
perpetuate the freedom and happiness of the people of United 
America, to endless time. ' ' With this in mind he mentioned the 
credulity wdth which the "feeble uninformed Spaniards" were 
"surrendering themselves to the interested, officious interfer- 

i" Inclosures in letter of Foleli to Someruelos. Reservado No. 130, Papeles Pro- 
eedentes ile la Isla de Cuba, Legajo 1566, Arehivo General de Indies, Seville. This 
source will be referred to as "Cuban Papers." The same material is found in 
Estado, Legajo 5550, Arehivo Historico National, Madrid. 

This correspondence was transmitted through Captain E. P. Gaines at Fort Stod- 
dert, whose suspicions were so thoroughly aroused, despite his friendship for Wilkin- 
son, that he made the matter the subject of a personal letter to Jefferson, January 
25, 1809. 

11 Wilkinson to Jefferson, October 1, 1808. Jefferson Papers, ser. 2, vol. 85:109. 



218 /. J. Cox M. V. H. R. 

eiice of the Britisli" from which Spanish-America was not like- 
ly to be exempt. He felt that agents should be sent to warn the 
Mexican authorities against these "insidious enci'oachments " 
and assure them of American sympathy and offered to convey 
this message to the Marques de Someruelos, whom he knew per- 
sonally. The marques was "extremely feminine in his exterior, 
and of feeble intellect" and "without some seasonable counter- 
action on our part" the British might "cajole or frighten him" 
out of Cuba and the Floridas. 

Wilkinson referred to the sentiments that the Mexicans had 
already expressed to Burling and to emphasize his own fitness 
for the proposed mission submitted a memorandum of his 
answers to some questions from Governor Herrera regarding 
the attitude of the United States towards Mexico. Wilkinson 
longed to obtain "some interesting appointment" which would 
enable him "by irrefragible evidence to strike dumb" his 
"slanderers and revilers." Probably this desire was strength- 
ened by the recent suggestion of the secretary of war, made 
in connection with an order to ascertain the fate of some mem- 
bers of Pike's party, that the officer sent for this purpose 
should note the general effect that recent events in Europe 
had had on Mexico. Such events might produce results "highly 
interesting to the United States" and demand their "strict at- 
tention."'- Thus influenced, Wilkinson composed a second let- 
ter to Herrera covertly suggesting coimuon action in behalf of 
Spanish-American independence. At the same time he did not 
neglect his personal affairs, for he asked Herrera to disprove 
the calumnies of liis enemies in regard to his relations with the 
Spaniards at the time of Burr's conspiracy.'" 

Early in November Wilkinson again assured Folch that the 
Spanish-Americans might count on the assistance of the United 
States. Despite newspaper reports to the contrary, ninety-nine 
out of a himdred of his fellow citizens felt the same. Their own 
affairs with Great Britain and with France were not in a flatter- 
ing condition. The embargo was to continue under yet greater 
restrictions. But he piously hoped that God would favor the 

12 Secretary of war to Wilkinson, September 8, 1808. Inclosed under date of Sep- 
tember 3, 1809. Manuseript in Letters Received, in war department. 

13 Wilkinson to Herrera, October 12, 1808. Jefferson Papers, ser. 3, vol. 85:108. 



Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 219 

cause of the just, in which number he included Folch's compa- 
triots as well as his own.'* 

Wilkinson's language nettled Folch because of its prophecy 
if not its hypocrisy. In his reply he called the American's at- 
tention to the series of defeats that the Spanish people had re- 
cently inflicted upon the French armies, by virtue of which they 
might style themselves the Romans of the modern world. For 
this reason the United States should value their friendship above 
that of any other power; but he failed to convince the other. 
While the general still hoped, as every good patriot should, that 
Heaven would favor "the magnanimous sons of the Peninsula," 
he feared that the combined armies of Alexander and of Bona- 
parte would prove irresistible. The colonial leaders should pre- 
pare for such an untoward event as the fall of the mother coun- 
try. Should this occur Spanish-America, united, organized, and 
in alliance with the United States, might bid defiance to all the 
warring nations of Europe.'^ In this fashion the suspected 
Spanish pensioner assumes a Pan-American role that places his 
name among the earliest advocates of the Monroe Doctrine. 
AVe cannot escape this conclusion unless we prefer to believe that 
Jefferson inspired his utterances, and this would imply an in- 
timacy between them that was of little credit to Jefferson. In 
his letter to Folch, Wilkinson expressed the hope that if his 
prophecy came true, Folch's "surpassing talents in political sci- 
ence" would receive adequate recognition. This reiterated wish 
aroused Folch's suspicion and led him to await with resentful 
curiosity their forthcoming interview. This was to take place 
as a result of Wilkinson's recent orders to assemble in New Or- 
leans "as large a body of troops as possible." '" 

With his usual desire to make an impression Wilkinson wrote 
Folch that his force was to number seven thousand.'' It was not 
this fact alone that alarmed the Spanish governor. His sus- 
picions were already aroused by the muster of the Orleans mili- 
tia in keeping with the new military policy of the American gov- 
ernment. He believed that that government had sold itself to 

i<Cf. n. 10. 

15 Of. n. 10. 

'^^ Annals of Congress of ihe United States, 11 Congress, 1 and 2 Session, 2:2435. 

17 Cf . n. 10. 



220 7. J. Cox M. V. H. R. 

France in return for a promise of the Floridas and Canada, and 
that Wilkinson's explanation was a mere pretext to lull him and 
his fellow officials into fancied security. Moreover Wilkinson 
wrote that he bore a special mission from the president of the 
United States to Someruelos and to Folch, and he asked the lat- 
ter to secure for him a favorable reception at Havana. 

The fact that Wilkinson was charged with a special mission to 
them aroused the apprehensions of both officials. Wilkinson's 
former position as a Spanish pensioner rendered him all the 
more dangerous. Folch feared that he might now employ in 
favor of the United States all those measures that he had former- 
ly advised Spain to use in curbing the former's territorial pre- 
tensions. Folch seemed to feel that his previous intimacy with 
Wilkinson might cast suspicion upon another interview between 
them. So he assured Someruelos that if any other than Wilkin- 
son was to be the president's messenger, he should try to pre- 
vent him from coming to Pensacola. But he knew the American 
general so well and had the key to so many of his secrets, that he 
thought he could gain from him more than anyone else. Wilkin- 
son believed him to be his friend and he had so acted on several 
occasions. The Spaniard regarded the general as a sort of fel- 
low subject, who had suffered on account of his attachment to 
Spanish interests, but at the same time he claimed that the Amer- 
ican lacked all qualities that could recommend him as a private 
individual.^* 

In reply Someruelos warned Folch to be circumspect in deal- 
ing with "No. 13," with whom in less critical times "His Majes- 
ty had some relations."'" He immediately asked the Mexican 
viceroy, Garibay, to assist him in defending the Floridas. Vidal 
had already informed the same official of the projected rendez- 
vous of the American troops. He had explained this on the 
ground that the American government hoped to gain the Flor- 
idas through French influence or at any rate keep Great Britain 
from occupying them. Vidal and Someruelos likewise learned 
this latest news regarding their "inquiet neighbors the Anglo- 
Americans" from Foronda, the charge representing the regency 
in the United States ; and each in turn transmitted the new de- 

i8Foleh to Someruelos, January 26, 1809. Eesen-ado No. 130; ef. n. 10. 
19 Someruelos to Folch, February 28, 1809. Cuban Papers, Legajo 1566. 



Vol. I, No. 2 Jt'ffcrson and Wilkinson 221 

tails to Mexico. Vidal also informed Folcli of Ms latest advices 
and surmises.-" As a result of this double warning, frontier 
officials in the interior provinces of Mexico and in the Floridas 
prepared to make the best arrangement of their slender re- 
sources to meet the anticipated peril. The incident illustrates 
the completeness and intricacy of the Spanish system for trans- 
mitting information. 

The hostile attitude of France and Great Britain furnished 
the pretext, if such were needed, for assembling this force in 
New Orleans. The government of the United States had already 
taken measures to increase its regular army and to mobilize the 
militia of the several states. Before the close of 1808 rumors 
became current that a large British fleet had been ordered from 
Halifax to the West Indies. The American press affected to be- 
lieve that it was destined for the Floridas, and that it might even 
attack New Orleans. These reports, \\\i\\ rumors of the revival 
of Burr's conspiracy, and with reported British intrigues in 
Spanish-America, alarmed the American government. In re- 
porting to their home authorities the Spanish and French rep- 
resentatives commented adversely upon these rumors and the 
consequent American precautions. Foronda asked the secre- 
tary of state to explain why the administration planned to con- 
centrate four thousand men in New Orleans. He expected Mad- 
ison to give an "oracular response" only to his inquiry. Tur- 
reau told his government that the English were demanding the 
privilege of navigating the Mississippi to Baton Eouge but that 
he had warned the Americans not to permit Great Britain to be- 
come their neighbor in the south as well as in Canada.-^ 

In due time the Spanish council of the regency at Seville 
turned its attention to the new problem afforded by the alleged 
hostile movements. Its members were persuaded that the United 
States was acting in accord with France. Secret emissaries of 
the latter power were already working in their colonies. It was 
true that Wilkinson, the designated commander at New Orleans, 

20 Vidal to Fokh, January 26, 1S09. Cuban Papers, Legajo 63. Vidal to Gari- 
bay, February 13, 1809. Estado, Legajo 5543, A. H. N. Someruelos to Garibay, 
February 12, 1809. Estado, Lega.ios 5543, 5550, A. H. N. 

21 Foronda to captain-general of Cuba, January 6, 1809. Cuban Papers, Legajo 
1708. Turreau to Champagny. .January 15, 1809, May 1, 1809. Affaires Etrangeres, 
£tats-Unis, 62:13, 142. 



222 1. J. Cox ^- V. H. R. 

had once been a Spanish pensioner, but his recent p^rt in Pike 's 
expedition rendered him an object of suspicion. His ambition 
might lead him to excite insurrection in the Spanish provinces. 
Acting under their instructions their representative in London, 
Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, reported this movement in the United 
States as new evidence that tlie enemy of universal tranquility 
had brought that power under his influence. Canning instructed 
the new British minister, Francis James Jackson, to make vig- 
orous representations on the subject." 

In his dispatch, referred to above, Turreau charged that the 
new administration under Madison desired to gain the Floridas 
just as the preceding one had gained Louisiana. Jefferson, in- 
deed, had suggested this idea in a letter to Monroe, January 28, 
1809. He believed, though unwillingly, that Bonaparte would 
subdue Spain. This might lead him as well as Great Britain to 
relax their commercial exactions. With the mother country at 
his feet the conqueror would gaze longingly upon her colonies 
and try to purchase the neutrality of the United States by re- 
pealing her decrees and perhaps including the Floridas in the 
bargain. Monroe, however, did not believe that success in Spain 
and in her colonies would lead Napoleon to favor the United 
States in this manner.-^ The expression indicates that the pres- 
ident was willing to profit in this way even while he was urging 
these colonies to exclude Napoleonic and British influence alike 
from this continent. But a few weeks later he wrote his friend 
Dupont de Nemours: "All these concerns I am now leaving to 
be settled by my friend, Mr. Madison." -* 

Meanwhile the man who was largely responsible for the anxi- 
ety of the Spaniards embarked at Baltimore on Januarj' 24, 
1809, for New Orleans. He took with him fifty barrels of flour 
— an act which may have caused his superiors some misgivings, 
for the embargo was still in force. Such minor points as this 
and his request for an extra allowance on his expense account 
caused public criticism and rendered him a less useful agent for 

22 Apodaca to Canning, May 18, 1809. Public Record Office, Foreign Office Rec- 
ords, Spain ser. 72, vol. 84. Apodaca to Garay, June 9, 1809. Estado, No. 197, 
Legajo 5559. 

23 Jefferson, Writings (Memorial ed.), 12:240; James Monroe, Writings (S. M. 
Hamilton ed. — New York, 1898-1903), -5:98. 

24 Jefferson, Writings (Memorial ed.), 12:259. 



Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 223 

the delicate mission before him.=^ While at a public dinner at 
Norfolk he displayed his unfitness still more clearly, when he 
proposed the toast: "The New World, governed by itself and in- 
dependent of the Old." Foronda promptly reported this to 
Someruelos as an additional reason for refusing him permission 
to land at Havana. Turreau carried his complaint directly to the 
department of state. Gallatin was instructed to tell him that 
the new administration must not be held responsible for Wilkin- 
son's vagaries.'* 

The American government was sending Wilkinson to Havana 
without a passport from Foronda. The Spanish charge also 
warned the authorities against another of Jefferson 's emissaries, 
"the assumed consul, Anderson." He hoped Someruelos would 
refuse to receive either and the captain-general wrote that he 
would do so. It was by conduct of this same Anderson that 
Wilkinson informed Someruelos of his proposed visit to Havana, 
to confer "on subjects of interest to our respective govern- 
ments. ' ' " Bad weather detained him at Charleston for some 
weeks; and during this delaj' here, as well as at other stopping 
places, he displayed a lively interest in such personal matters 
as his future career, the new head of the war department, and 
the latest "vindictive efforts" of "Randolph and the black 
mouthed federalists." In addition to his enemies in his rear he 
looked forward -ftdth some perturbation to meeting Daniel Clark 
at New Orleans.-* 

Wilkinson and liis flour were conveyed from Charleston to 
Havana on the sloop of war Hornet which on March 23 reached 
the Cuban port. Here he found a series of riots in progress 
against its French residents. So great was the resentment 
against all foreigners that his aide-de-camp experienced some 
difficulty in presenting a personal I'equest for audience with the 
captain-general. Despite the latter 's assurance to Foronda, he 
formally received the American general and his suite. Possibly 
some of Wilkinson's flour aided in bringing about this conces- 

2^Seport on General WilMnson, 503, 5-i.j, 5.59, 56."!, 564. Cf. n. 8. 

2« Foronda to captain-general of Cuba, January 20, 1809. Cuban Papers, Legajo 
1708. Turreau to Champagny, June 1, 1809. Affaires ^trangeres, £tats-Unis, 62:194. 

-'' Wilkinson to Someruelos, February 22, 1809. Cuban Papers, Legajo 1708. 

28 Wilkinson to Dearborn, January 2, 1809; Wilkinson to John Smith, chief clerk 
of the war department, March 12, 1809. Letters Received, war department. 



224 1. J. Cox M- V. H. K. 

sion. On the twenty-sixth the general gave Someruelos an un- 
signed note which the latter answered on the thirtieth. Dis- 
turbances within the city prevented further conferences, and on 
April 2 Wilkinson continued his voyage to New Orleans. Upon 
his departure Someruelos sent Garibay a new call for help which 
caused the officials of New Spain to renew their efforts at de- 
fense and adopt at their chief seaports a more intolerant attitude 
against foreign commerce.-'' 

What was there in Wilkinson's or rather Jefferson's com- 
munication to Someruelos to produce such a result! The mis- 
sive begins by expressing sympathy for Spain in its struggle for 
independent existence and regrets that the police regulations 
necessary to enforce the embargo had inconvenienced its "inno- 
cent neighbors." This suggestion of a difference between their 
attitude towards the colonies and the mother country is further 
emphasized by the statement that the United States cherished 
no antipathy against Spain and still less against ' ' its immediate 
neighbors in the Western Hemisphere. ' ' In view of Wilkinson 's 
later proposals t» Vidal and to Folch we may regard this as de- 
signed to entice Someruelos into independent action ; but the 
captain-general ignored it. 

After this elaborate introduction of marked friendhness there 
follows a statement that Wilkinson was to reinforce New Or- 
leans for the sole purpose of protecting recognized American 
territory. The United States neither intended nor desired to 
usurp any region occupied by Spain. For the present it would 
not even reopen its claim to West Florida. But if an "inimical 
power" attempted to use that territory in attacking the Ameri- 
can possessions on the Mississippi or to disembark troops in 
East Florida, then the United States would "regard itself as 
authorized (without any hostile view against Spain or its inter- 
ests) by well known principles in time of war, and by Natural 
law and the law of Nations, to oppose such an attempt by all 
possible means ; counteracting the designs of its enemies by such 
movements and seizures as circumstances should dictate." Such 
was the message that Wilkinson was charged to deliver in the 
"true spirit of conciliation and good will." It will be observed 

29 Someruelos to Garibay, April 7, 1809. Estado, Legajo 5543, A. H. N.; also 
Cuban Papers, Legajo 1708. 



Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 225 

that it closely follows Wilkinson's suggestions to the president. 

The captain-general's natural impulse was to ignore this com- 
bined temptation and threat. The recent warnings of Folch and 
of Foronda impelled him to take the same course, and to inform 
his fellow officials of the impending danger. He answered Wil- 
kinson that his missive suggested momentous diplomatic ques- 
tions that only those "especially appointed for the purpose" 
could discuss. He mentioned the ruin that threatened most 
European peoples and w^arned against trixsting the unnamed 
Corsican. He inclosed with his note a proclamation that he had 
lately used to arouse the people of Cuba. Thus he foiled Wil- 
kinson's attempt either to seduce or to frighten him. The Amer- 
ican general must then direct his efforts towards his whilom 
friends, Folch and Vidal. ' 

The former was not in Pensacola when Wilkinson reached that 
port, for he had already transported himself to Baton Rouge, 
the anticipated scene of danger, just as he had done under sim- 
ilar circumstances in 1804 and in 1807. From the mouth of the 
Mississippi the general informed the new secretary of war that 
"the awfully critical situation of Spanish-America imperiously 
enjoins it on us to strengthen this feeble, remote and exposed 
quarter." He may have felt that Great Britain's forces in the 
West Indies constituted a serious menace, for he offered to seize 
West Florida before that power could do so. Perhaps he was 
not sure of the new administration's attitude despite what he 
had just told Someruelos. He suggested that this seizure might 
"affect Cuba and Mexico to our injury." ^° He may have feared 
that either Great Britain would then occupy Cuba or the Mexi- 
can authorities reject the proffered American alliance. 

While Wilkinson was journeying towards New Orleans affairs 
in that city were shaping themselves to promote his mission. 
On March 19, Claiborne wrote the secretary of state that two 
officers, whom he regarded as Folch 's personal representatives, 
had expressed their opinion that their country must shortly 
yield to Bonaparte. Thereupon the Spanish possessions would 
declare their independence. In that event they wished to know 
if the American government would receive a minister from 
Mexico? Claiborne guardedly replied that while he had no in- 

30 James Wilkinson, Memoirs of Mi) Om Timfs (Phil.adelphia, 1816), 2:.?44-.S49. 



■226 I. J. Cox M. V. H. R. 

structions to guide him, he thought the United States would glad- 
ly do so. His informants then stated that a certain Rendon had 
already been designated to represent Mexico in the United 
States, and a Spaniard of Irish extraction, Murphy by name, in 
Gi'eat Britain. These officers also intimated that under the new 
regime East and West Florida might be ceded to the United 
States, and they represented this as Folch's own view.''^ It cer- 
tainly differs from the sentiment expressed in his comments on 
Wilkinson's previous suggestions, but the wily Spaniard may 
have used this method to ascertain Claiborne's position on this 
and kindred topics. It might lead the Americans to take the 
initiative, when the conditions grew so bad that he could no long- 
er hold his pro\ance, and thus relieve him of a certain respon- 
sibility to his own government. On the other hand Claiborne 
evidently wished to avoid committing himself even to the extent 
that Jefferson's letter of the previous October justified him in 
going. 

The president evidently wished to be sure that the Spaniards 
learned of his intentions, for shortly after this interview Clai- 
borne received from him instructions similar to those given Wil- 
kinson. In this propaganda therefore the two men were to be 
closely associated, but the Orleans executive was not wholly in 
the dark as to the aims of his colleague as he had been on former 
occasions. This promised more benefit to the nation, if not to 
the latter 's devious schemes. He therefore broached the matter 
to Vidal, the Spanish vice consul, who had already noted the ar- 
rival of American recruits in New Orleans. Vidal also knew 
that Wilkinson intended to call on Folch and Someruelos while 
on his way to that place. For some time lie had tried in vain to 
learn the reason for these movements. In the latter part of 
March Claiborne called on him, in accordance with Jetferson's 
instructions, and readily explained the mystery.'- 

The American executive assured Vidal that his government 
cherished the utmost good ■will for Spain and its colonies, de- 
spite discreditable reports to the contrary, and wislied for the 

31 Personal letter of Claiborne to secretary of state, March 19, 1809. Manuscript 
in Claiborne package in bureau of rolls and library. D. W. Parker, Calendar of 
Papers in Washington Archives Selating to the Territories of the United States 
(Washington, 1911), no. 7560. 

32 Vidal to Garibay, .\pril 10, 1809. Marina, 1809-1814. cf. n. 9. 



Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 227 

mother country a happy outcome in its struggle against the 
"Tyrant of Europe." If, unhappily, the result should be other- 
wise, his superiors were ready to aid the colonies in every possi- 
ble way, provided they preferred the rule of Ferdinand VII or 
of any other government than France. The president believed 
that the United States could do this without cooperating with 
"any other nation holding similar views." For this purpose it 
was ready to declare Avar against France and constitute itself the 
protector and ally of those colonies that were unwilling to follow 
the fate of the metropolis. If they desired to send an envoy 
to treat with his government, he would meet with a friendly 
reception and obtain marked favors for his constituents. 

The vice consul thanked Claiborne for his friendly sentiments, 
but added that his government had not authorized him to discuss 
such delicate matters. Personally he believed that the Spanish 
colonies would never submit to a foreign power, nor forget their 
allegiance to Ferdinand VII or his heirs. Like the people of 
Old Spain too, those of New Spain were not unmindful of Great 
Britain 's efforts in their behalf. The suggestion that that power 
must be included in the proposed diplomatic undertaking was 
not lost on the American representative. On the whole Vidal 
was much more circumspect in his attitude than Folch, although 
we must remember that he was making his own report, while 
Claiborne is narrating the statements of unofficial intermediaries. 
Yet Claiborne's later report based on a personal interview was 
of the same tenor. 

In April the Orleans executive was at Pointe Coupee, opposite 
Baton Rouge ; Folch was then at the latter place and immediate- 
ly invited the other to dine with him. The governor is our only 
authority for what took place, for Folch himself evidently did 
not report this interview to Someruelos ; yet we may be certain 
that he represents the Spaniard's professed views. 

Folch thought that Spain still had a chance to oppose Bona- 
parte. In any event the colonies, especially Cuba and Mexico, 
would never recognize a dynasty that he supported, but upon the 
first intimation of Spain's fall, would proclaim their independ- 
ence. Folch also professed to believe that the Floridas must in- 
eAatably pass into the possession of the United States, for they 
were of value only to that power. His offer to deliver to it his 



228 /. J. Cox M. V. H. B. 

own pro\'ince a year and a half later is in keeping with this al- 
leged opinion. Folch also expressed the resentment that the 
regency felt over the report that Joseph Bonaparte proposed 
to cede the Ploridas to the United States. He suggested that 
his nation wished to cultivate friendly relations wth the latter 
and had apprised Great Britain of this fact. He may have 
wished to intimate that the United States would profit more 
from the combined friendship of those two peoples than from 
its foiTner subserviency to France. 

In reply Claiborne stated that his country was intensely in- 
terested in Spain's struggle for independence, but its policy was 
not to interfere directly in European affairs. If Spain should 
be successful, the United States would acquiesce in her domina- 
tion of Cuba and Mexico, but would regret to see them under the 
political or commercial control either of Great Britain or of 
France. These expressions are in harmony with those of Wil- 
kinson and so closely follow Jefferson's previous suggestions 
that one need not seek further to fiml their author.^^ 

Folch, like Vidal, mentioned Spain's feeling of gratitude to- 
wards Great Britain, thus indicating that this sentiment had 
a common origin. But he did not think that that power would 
ever gain possession of the Spanish colonies. He admitted that 
Mexico and Cuba would need a foreign alliance to maintain 
their independence, and would probably approach both Great 
Britain and the United States on this subject, but preferably 
the latter. Claiborne mentioned the desire to exclude from this 
continent all European and particularly British and French in- 
fluence as a giiarantee that in their struggle for independence 
Mexico and Cuba might rely absolutely on the friendship of his 
country. He assured the other that these were his private views 
only, but the}'' follow Jefferson's letter almost verbatim. Pos- 
sibly he desired to rival the West Florida governor in finesse. 
Doubtless he M'as gratified when later at dinner Folch gave as 
his toast : ' ' The liberty of the New World ; may it never be as- 
sailed with success by the old World. ' ' Possiljly Folch knew of 
Wilkinson's similar toast at Norfolk and was derisively para- 
phrasing it for his guest's benefit. The latter reported that the 

33 Personal letter of rlaiboviic to Smith. April ill, 1S09. Parker, Calcinlar of 
Papers, no. 7r>67. 



Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 229 

assembled company, largely composed of Spanish officials, re- 
ceived the toast with favor. 

If, in New Orleans and Baton Rouge, Great Britain seemed 
the chief obstacle to a Pan-American alliance, France appeared 
in a similar light to the administration. Evidently Jefferson's 
books and his farm did not wholly suffice to occupy his attention 
in retirement, for, on April 19, he wrote to his successor: "I 
suppose the conquest of Spain will soon force a delicate question 
on j'ou as to the Floridas and Cuba, which will offer themselves 
to you. Napoleon will certainly give his consent without diffi- 
culty to our receiving the Floridas, and with some difficulty pos- 
sibly Cuba." Eight days later he added : "Napoleon ought to 
conciliate our good mil because we can be an obstacle to the new 
career opening to him in the Spanish colonies." The Floridas 
alone would not be a sufficient reward for American neutrality. 
Our government would acquire them anyhow at the first outbreak 
of war and until then did not need them. Napoleon must also 
agree to the American acquisition of Cuba, if he wished a free 
hand in Mexico and the remaining colonies.^* This implied 
doubt in regard to the outcome of Wilkinson's mission and a 
desire to secure American interests in any event. He wrote W. 
C. Nicholas that, in case Napoleon continued his commercial 
exactions, the people of Cuba and the Floridas might proffer 
themselves to the United States. 

The situation had greatly changed since the preceding autumn. 
Then neither France nor Great Britain showed any disposition 
to compose its differences wdth the United States. Now Madison 
thought that the former was inclined to be more conciliatory. 
If, then. Napoleon should attempt to keep the United States 
from trading with the Spanish colonies, as it had formerly done 
with Santo Domingo, and should couple this requisition -with an 
offer to cede the Floridas, it "would pi'esent a dilemma not very 
pleasant. " ^'^ Evidently his ambition was not so great as his 
predecessor's who wished to mark our territorial pretensions 
to the southward by a column on the farther shore of Cuba. In 
Jefferson's view we could defend this region without a navy and 
this factor should determine our rule for expansion. 

34.Teffer8on, Writings (Memorial ed.), 12:273, 277. 

35 James Madison, Writingtt (G. Hunt ed. — New York, 1900-1910), 8:33. 



230 7. J. Cox ^- V- H. B. 

TuiTeau had already presented the unpleasant "dilemma" 
that Madison feared. Incensed at the repeal of the embargo, 
which, unaccompanied by a declaration of war, he regarded as a 
pro-British measure, he now demanded from the new adminis- 
tration an explanation of some other current rumors. One re- 
ferred to a general project to revolutionize Spanish-America. 
Another specifically charged the American government wdth in- 
citing secret assemblies in the Floridas, patterned after those 
that Miranda had organized in Caracas, and encouraging similar 
measures in Cuba. Finally the anxietj^ in regard to the British 
fleet at Halifax was simply a pretext to justify the concentration 
of troops at New Orleans. The French minister professed to 
believe that these reports were circulated by those who wished 
to sever the harmony existing between his nation and the United 
States, yet he had reported them to his court and awaited with 
interest an explicit answer from the American authorities.^* 

The president had already written to Jefferson : ' ' Cuba will, 
without doubt, be a cardinal object with Napoleon." Could he 
have seen Turreau's dispatch to Champagny of April 22, 1809, 
he would have been confii'med in this view and doubtful of the 
immediate future. The French minister claimed that the con- 
centration of American troops in New Orleans under Wilkinson 
arose from a desire to cooperate with the independent party in 
the Floridas, rather than to defend that city against possible 
British attack. Wilkinson's visit to Havana gave point to an 
anonymous chai-ge, which he attributed to a clerk in the state 
department, that the United States was sending revolutionary 
agents to Mexico, the Floridas, and Cuba. Turreau suggested 
that his government should use the riots in Cuba that had in- 
terfered with Wilkinson's mission as a pretext for the immediate 
seizure of that island. Having thus forestalled the Americans 
there, the Fi''ench might later occupy the Floridas and Mexico.'' 

After submitting his pointed inquiries of April 15, Turreau 
withdrew in a rage to Baltimore. Madison desired to avoid 
rupture with France and requested Gallatin to call on her min- 
ister on his way northward and explain the real sentiments of 
the administration. Evidently Gallatin believed that the presi- 

36 Affaires :fitrangei-es, fitats-Unis, 62:123. 

37 Affaires fitrangeres, fitats-Unis, 62:121, 122. 



Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 231 

dent's \dews were the same as his own; otherwise, it will be diffi- 
cult to reconcile Turreau's report of them, if correctly given, 
with Madison's later action. 

Gallatin told the French minister that the administration dis- 
claimed all responsibility for Wilkinson's utterance such as the 
Norfolk toast. This was to be attributed to "the vanity, the 
indiscretion and the ordinary inconsistencies of that General," 
whom the other knew as well as they. If Turreau imagined 
that Mr. Madison desired the Floridas, he was mistaken. That 
was Mr. Jefferson 's hobby, but did not represent the views of his 
cabinet. The Floridas would be desirable only because their 
possession might prevent misunderstandings ^\ith Spain and se- 
cure an outlet for the southern states. The administration was 
in no way responsible for such popular meetings as had taken 
place there, and they had heard nothing in regard to Wilkinson 's 
reception by the Spaniards. As for Cuba, the United States 
would not take it as a gift.^' 

Gallatin's assurances evidently failed to convince the other. 
In reporting them Turreau called his supei'ior's attention to the 
fact that they were accompanied by no favorable action in re- 
gard to a commercial policy. At the same time Secretary Smith 
instructed Armstrong at Paris to say that while it was the gen- 
eral policy of the United States to preserve neutrality towards 
the Spanish colonies, they would feel free to act otherwise, if 
necessary to preserve their territorial claims.^^ When the Er- 
skine agreement resulted in a fiasco, Jefferson wrote Madison 
that if Bonaparte were wise enough to change his attitude to- 
ward the United States he must inevitably lead it to declare war 
against England. In that event he advised the immediate occu- 
pation of Baton Rouge in order to forestall the British. Our 
claim to this territory' would justify the step.*" 

The inconsistencies of Jeft'erson's and Madison's commercial 
policy thus characterize their attitude towards Spanish-America 
and even the neighboring West Florida. Jefferson was ready 
to assist a revolt in the Spanish colonies, should Bonaparte dom- 

38 Adams, History of the TJnited, States, 5:37, 38. 

39 Smith to Armstrong, May 8, 1809. Instructions, vol. 7, manuscript in bureau 
of indexes and archives. 

<« Jeflferson, Writings (Memorial ed.), 12:304. 



232 I. J. Cox M- V. H. B. 

inate Spain. Foi- this he expected the Floridas as his reward. 
Hence, his desire to open diplomatic relations with them, even 
through the untrustworthy Wilkinson. At the same time if Bon- 
aparte should pursue a more favorable commercial policy to- 
wards us, he miglit purchase our neutrality in respect to his own 
Spanish-American plans, by the bribe of the same Floridas with 
Cuba included. His own cabinet did not seem to approve his 
•\aews, but he persisted in setting them on foot, and even exerted 
pressure on his successor to continue them. On assuming office, 
the latter promptly repudiated them, but ere his first adminis- 
tration was half completed, he was exerting powerful efforts to 
gain both the Floridas, and at the same time truckling to Bona- 
parte. 

Meanwhile the unconscious if not innocent object of so much 
report and conjecture reached New Orleans. His long delayed 
arrival represents a distinct anticlimax to what might have 
proved an interesting diplomatic episode. Wilkinson's inter- 
views with his former friends Vidal and Folch were as fruitless 
as his brief \'isit to Havana. To the former he immediately re- 
ported the substance of his communication to Captain-General 
Someruelos. This did not differ materialh' from what Clai- 
borne had already told the vice consul about the proposed Pan- 
American alliance. In reply Vidal repeated what he had pre- 
viously said to the governor — that Spanish-America would 
probably follow the lead of the mother country and preserve 
friendly relations with Great Britain. Consequently any hostil- 
ity between that power and the United States might be an obsta- 
cle to the proposed Pan-American alliance. 

Wilkinson claimed to represent the sentiments of the admin- 
istration and now told Vidal that he expected his country and 
Great Britain to compose their differences and declare war 
against France. In that case there would be no objection to in- 
cluding Great Britain in the proposed alliance. He may have 
had some intimation of the Erskine correspondence upon which 
to base his assei'tion. Vidal was inclined to believe that Wilkin- 
son correctly reported the attitude of his government, for unless 
the British nation was a party to the suggested alliance, the 
United States would be more than ever exposed to European 



Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 23o 

inacliinations. Yet he felt tliat the western world as a whole 
was reasonably safe from European invasion. He even sug- 
gested that the death of the tyrant or some other accident might 
afford the united and grateful Spanish colonies an opportunity 
to rescue the mother country from captivity."^ 

We have as yet no complete evidence that Jefferson instructed 
Wilkinson to propose a Pan-American alliance to the Spanish 
officials that he visited. His cabinet had tentatively suggested 
such a policy before he ordered Wilkinson to New Orleans. 
That general had more than hinted at it and was only too anx- 
ious to receive instructions to carry it out. His communications 
to Somenielos suggest that he had them in reser^^^e but the riots 
in Havana and the captain-general's attitude gave him no chance 
to present them. The case was otherwise in New Orleans where 
his former friends not only gave him the opportunity but even 
partly suggested the subject matter of his discourse. 

It is likewise possible that Wilkinson first defimtely heard 
of the proposed alliance from Vidal and Claiborne, after his 
arrival in New Orleans. Owing to the lack of discipline among 
his troops and the havoc already wrought by disease it would 
be a useless proceeding to assure the Spanish authorities that 
they had nothing to apprehend from the military forces in New 
Orleans. They already knew that for themselves. On the other 
hand the condition of these forces afforded his enemies another 
opportunity to attack him, and they quickly took advantage of it. 
Accordinglj' he must employ every possible means to strengthen 
his tottering influence. He attacked his enemies for seeking to 
discourage enlistments or to persuade his officers to resign. He 
appealed to the Spaniards in the interior provinces for addition- 
al testimony in his favor. At the same time he suggested to 
the administration a comprehensive plan for immediately occu- 
pying West Florida and defending New Orleans. In his extrem- 
ity the suggested alliance offered still another possibility of re- 
deeming himself. He was fully instructed to interview Folch 
on another subject. He would add to it the proposed alliance, 
appeal to their former friendship, tempt the governor's person- 
al ambition, and lead him to place himself at the head of this 

41 Inclosure no. 2 in letter of Vidal to Garibay, April 10, 1809. Cf. n. 32. 



234 7. J. Cox M. V. H. R. 

new movement. Vidal had suggested the necessity of including 
Great Britain in this alliance, and although without definite in- 
structions on this point, he incorporated it in his proposal. By 
this means he would inaugurate a deservedly popular movement, 
in the glory of which he might be safe from his most persistent 
foes. 

In pursuit of this plan, therefore, Wilkinson met Folch at the 
San Juan bridge, April 28, and conducted him in a carriage to 
the government house in New Orleans. In the course of their 
ride together, as he tells us in two separate accounts, they 
conversed on the fate of Spain and the future interests of her 
colonies. He reported that Folch fully expected Bonaparte to 
triumph over Spain, but before that event he hoped the junta 
would direct him to deliver West Florida to the United States. 
Mexico must then seek to presei-ve her independence either by 
joining the United States or forming a confederation of her own. 
This is in keeping Avitli Claiborne's previous report of the gov- 
ernor's attitude. Perhaps Wilkinson used this to fabricate the 
whole interview, or else Folch was playing with him as he had 
with the Orleans executive. 

When Folch mentioned the possibility of a Spanish-American 
confederation, Wilkinson remarked that to it the Floridas would 
form a "feeble and pernicioiis appendage." Folch assented 
and stated in case the junta did not act as he hoped, he wouJd 
apply to the viceroy of Mexico for power to surrender West 
Florida; failing in that, to the president himself. He declared 
that Great Britain should never get the province, for it was 
"as necessaiy to the United States as the drawer is to the case." 
The astonished Wilkinson observed that "the subject presented 
a solid ground of Conciliation and mutual Confidence," between 
their countries, wliich he would gladly promote. Folch declared 
that he had never before uttered this idea, but itiollows so 
closely his interview with Claiborne in Baton Rouge that one is 
tempted still more to regard that as the real source of Wilkin- 
son's reports. The general closes by advising his superiors to 
send an agent immediately to confer with Folch on the surrender 
of his province," which he suggested might be hastened by ' ' an 

*- J. W. to Madison, May 1, 1S09. Calendar of the Correspondence of James 



Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 235 

indemnity" to its officials. This was a natural but sinister sug- 
gestion in view of the charges already pending against the gen- 
erah 

If we are inclined to regard as genuine this report of the in- 
terview between Wilkinson and Folch, we may find evidence to 
corroborate it in Claiborne's contemporary correspondence. The 
latter wrote that while Folch was in New Orleans he freely ex- 
pressed himself as favoring the independence of Spanish-Amer- 
ica. He also conveyed the impression that most of his fellow 
oflScials entertained the same views. Claiborne, however, doubt- 
ed if the people were prepared for such a step. They were "de- 
plorably ignorant, unusually superstitious, for the most part 
poor, indolent and easih' controlled by their priests." Any at- 
tempt on their part at self government, therefore, would be fol- 
lowed by "scenes affecting to humanity." The anarchy then 
prevailing in Havana suggested the possibility of reenaoting 
there another Santo Domingo. 

Claiborne thought that neither Mexico nor Cuba single handed 
could long maintain its independence. With the people soon 
losing their enthusiasm it would be impossible to keep them out 
of the clutches of France or Great Britain. In such a contin- 
gency the latter might demand a commercial monopoly as its re- 
ward and this course would prove as injurious as the rule of 
Joseph Bonaparte. Claiborne felt that it would be impossible to 
maintain much longer the policy of neutrality that the United 
States had hitherto observed between the rival factions in Spain. 
"The interest of the United States requires that all European 
influence should be banished from the continent of Amei"ica," 
he echoed, and ' ' the i^resent crisis is favorable to the accomplish- 
ment of so desirable an object." He closed by stating that he 
forebore to ad\-ise the government further." It was well that 
he did so, for he was simply paraphrasing Jefferson's missive of 
the preceding October. 

Folch 's own letters to his superiors are tilled ^rith strong ex- 
pression of loyalty to Ferdinand VII, and he offered to serve 

Maainon (Washiugton, 1894-1895), 726; also 38 Miseellaneous Letters, filed uuder 
date of January 1, 1813, in bureau of indexes and archives. 

« aaiborne to Smith, May 14, 1809. Claiborne Correspondence, 5. Parker, Cal- 
endar of Papers, no. 7567. 



236 /. J. Cox ^i- V. H. R. 

Spain against the invader. These letters and his own subse- 
quent course certainly show him in no sense as a champion of 
Spanish-American independence. Yet it is probable that the 
reports of Wilkinson and Claiborne in regard to his willingness 
to deliver West Florida may have some foundation, for a year 
and a half later he actually made such an offer. It is likely, too, 
that when his offer came, the administration conceived extrava- 
gant hopes from it based on his earlier conversations with these 
American officials. On the other hand it is equally likely that, 
while conferring with them, the Spaniard knowingly conveyed 
more than his real view's. He despised Claiborne and distrust- 
ed Wilkinson, and may have thought himself justified in deceiv- 
ing them and the government they represented. From it, if 
not from its immediate agents, he apprehended the most imme- 
diate peril to his dominions. 

So far as his letters from New Orleans are concerned, one 
might infer that Wilkinson's mission was simply to reassure 
him upon this point. The general delivered to him a communi- 
cation similar to the one already given Someruelos, to explain 
the assembling of American troops at New Orleans. Folch ad- 
mitted that this movement had caused him some anxiety, appre- 
ciated the good intentions of the United States, and assured 
Wilkinson that his own were friendly.** When, however, Folch 
returned to Pensacola, he unbosomed himself to his superior. 
His letter on this occasion clearly shows that Wilkinson's elabor- 
ate explanation of the presence of troops in New Orleans was 
largely a pretext suggested by Jefferson to conceal their real 
purpose — the opening of diplomatic relations with the Spanish 
colonies. 

Wilkinson tried to show Folch, so the latter wrote, that Spain 
was bound to succumb to Bonaparte. According to Claiborne's 
report the Spanish governor already believed this, but he ob- 
viously did not wish his superior to think so. In such an event 
it would be highly desirable to forai an alliance to include Span- 
ish-America, Brazil, the United States, and, if necessary, Eng- 
land. The addition of the last-named power was probably an 

■I* Wilkinson to Folch, May 3, 1809; Folch to Wilkinson, May 4, 1809. J. A. Rob- 
ertson, List of Documents in Spanish Archives . . . of Which Transcripts are 
Preserved in American Libraries (Washington, 1910), nos. 5168, 5169. 



Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 237 

after-thought inspii'ed by the interviews with Vidal, or by pre- 
liminaiy information in regard to the abortive Erskine conven- 
tion. In case the Spanish colonies declared their independence, 
it would be desirable for them to have an agent near the United 
States, and Folch himself would most acceptably fill that office 
because he knew so thoroughly all the factors involved. This 
additional evidence afforded by Wilkinson's interview mth the 
Spanish governor serves as a link in Jefferson's poUcy and ex- 
plains the general's correspondence of the preceding autumn. 

Folch told Wilkinson, so he wrote Somenielos,^^ that while he 
felt flattered at this expression of confidence in himself, he 
thought that children ought not to be in haste to divide a par- 
ent's property before her death. Furthermore he had no inten- 
tion of beginning a policy that he could not carry through. Be- 
lieving that both Wilkinson and Claiborne represented the ideas 
of their government, he pointed out to his superior that the pro- 
posed alliance might serve to rescue the mother country from 
Bonaparte. Possibly he desired thus to protect himself, should 
any report of his views as given to Claiborne or to Wilkinson 
chance to reach Someruelos. Folch assured the latter that Amer- 
ica, well governed and united, would be inaccessible to Bona- 
parte. Should his ambitions tempt him, the voyage would mark 
the beginning of his overthrow and the climate, its end. The 
Corsican, however, would hardly venture to repeat on so exten- 
sive a scale his experience in Santo Domingo, j'et the governor 
assured the captain general that he was ready to act against him 
as Someruelos might desire. 

In communicating Folch 's dispatches to his superiors, Som- 
eruelos observed that he was unable to appreciate Folch 's con- 
versations with Claiborne and with Wilkinson, for that official 
had not reported them in sufficient detail. He advised the gov- 
ernor to remedj^ his reports in that respect. He also expressed 
his surprise that Folch had ventured to discuss such delicate 
subjects and advised him to shun this course in the future, for 
the Americans simply desired to draw out the views of the Span- 
iards and later turn them to their advantage. The uniform re- 
ply to suggestions for independence and alliance should be that 

«5 Foleh to Someruelos, May 23, 1809. Robertson, List of Documents, no. 5170. 



238 7. J. Cox M. V. H. R. 

the Spaniards would die to preserve the union of the two Amer- 
icas with Spain/" 

Despite the firmness of tone that Someruelos assumed towards 
his superiors, or that Folch emploj'ed with him, there is a sug- 
gestion that each heUeved that a speedy catastrophe was inevi- 
table, but wished to shield himself from any responsibility for 
it. Folch also attempted to play off Claiborne against Wilkin- 
son in an endeavor to ascertain if both correctly reported the 
attitude of their superiors, while Vidal evidently worked with 
him to the same end. At the same time Folch expressed him- 
self so as to arouse American hopes in regard to the Floridas 
and establish his influence with their officials in case he had to 
rely upon them in an extremity. In this way in the crisis of 
1810-1811, he managed through the American authorities to pre- 
serve Mobile from a filibustering expedition, and at the same 
time remained in good standing with his superiors. Such was 
the influence of the Florida question that it led American and 
Spanish officials alike to adopt a shifting course of duplicity. 

That this influence was marked in the case of Wilkinson is 
shown by his communication of May 12 to the secretary of war. 
Folch was still in the city and his own army disorganized, but he 
suggested an elaborate plan to defend the region, of which West 
Florida constituted the danger point.*' A week later, after the 
Spanish governor had left New Orleans but before he had 
reached Pensacola, Wilkinson reported that a "commotion" 
threatened to break out in that city. Folch was likely to call 
upon him for assistance. He might be overthrown either "by 
the usurpation of the Spanish subjects or by the enterprise of 
the American settlers." In view of possible public advantage 
he wished to receive instructions at the earliest possible mo- 
ment.*' In reply the secretary of war wrote him, July 22, 1809 : 
"It is the continued wish and instruction of the president that 
no interference of any kind in the affairs and territories of Spain 
should take place, or be encouraged, or permitted, by any person 
or persons, whether civil or military belonging to or under the 

«6 Someruelos to G. F. O., October 8, 1809. Cuban Papers, Legajo 157. 
<' Wilkinson, Memoirs, 2:351. 
ts/birf., 2:357. 



Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 239 

authority of the United States."" E\ddently the protests of 
the French minister were beginning to affect the administration, 
although Canning's repudiation of the Erskine agreement con- 
tributed to the same end and warned it not to complicate its for- 
eign policy further. Thus ended the first effort of the United 
States to initiate a Pan-American policy. Jefferson, in retire- 
ment, could not force his successor to continue his mistaken 
policy, nor support his unworthj^ protege. The latter was 
obliged to resign his command and come northward in an un- 
availing attempt to clear himself from charges of inefficiency as 
well as of personal corruption. 

Isaac Joslin Cox 
unrveesity of cincinnati 

*9 Wilkinson to N. Salcedo, August 31, 1809. MSS. Internas Provincias Interras, 
vol. 239, Expediente 2, p. 33, Arebivo General, Mexico. 



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